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Abstract 
Purpose 
This study aims to explore how urban governance of Hong Kong is 
impacted by the formulation and implementation of the new 
constitutional order of “one country, two systems” that distinguishes 
between the British colonial government and the current government 
under Chinese sovereignty. 
Design/methodology/approach 
While the literature recognises the society of Hong Kong has been heavily 
relying on land and property activities, few attempts notice the 
uniqueness of Hong Kong’s sequential constitutional orders and its 
relations to those activities. This study presents a geographical enquiry 
and an archival study to illustrate the spatiality of the new constitutional 
order and its implications on land injustice. Drawing from the works of 
legal geography and urban studies, this study extends and clarifies Anne 
Haila’s conception of Hong Kong as “property state” to “property 
jurisdiction”. 
Findings 
Though common law and leasehold land system were perpetuated from 
the colonial period, the new constitutional order changed their practices 
and the underlying logic and ideology. The urban governance order of this 
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property jurisdiction is intended for prosperity and stability of the society, 
and for the economic benefit and territorial integrity claim of the Chinese 
sovereignty. 
Originality/value 
This study enriches the literature of Hong Kong studies in three major 
areas, namely, the relationship with China, urban governance and land 
injustice. It offers a conceptual discussion, which contributes to 
comparative territorial autonomies studies. It also contributes to legal 
geography by providing insights beyond the western liberal democracy 
model. 
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Introduction 
The literature on Hong Kong has never downplayed the crucial role of 
landed property and real estate development. Phrases such as “real estate 
hegemony” (Poon, 2005), “land (re) development regime” (Tang, 2008), 
“property-led financial regime” (Smart and Lee, 2003), “land-dependent 
economy” (Wong, 2015) and “property-led urban development” (Ip, 2018) 
are invoked to characterise Hong Kong’s urban governance dynamics. 
These works provide useful vocabulary for recognising the domination of 
property development and discussing land injustice in Hong Kong. 
However, they mainly focus on the economic aspect of how the property 
market works and functions, and the social aspect of how the hegemony 
of private property development exploits the social life of the general 
public. More linkages with the political implications should be added to 
the discussion. One of such attempts had been made by Anne Haila in her 
promising comparative urban analyses of Hong Kong and Singapore 
(Haila, 2000, 2016, 2017). She conceptualised Hong Kong (and Singapore) 
as a property state because the real estate development does not only 
dominate the functioning of the whole economy but also contribute to a 
significant proportion in the public finance due to the leasehold land 
system. While these ideas are convincing, they are still found wanting for 
neglecting the greatest constitutional difference between these two cities 
– Singapore is an independent state, but Hong Kong is not. This article, 
thus, seeks to clarify and extend Anne Haila’s earlier conception of Hong 
Kong as a property state to a property jurisdiction, addressing the 
following issues in Hong Kong studies. 
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Several questions in Hong Kong studies remain for further and continuous 
explorations (Lui et al., 2019; Lui and Fong, 2018), including, for example, 
how to understand urban governance of Hong Kong? How to understand 
the relations between Hong Kong and China? It is the objective of this 
article to address these issues by exploring how urban governance of Hong 
Kong is impacted by the “one country, two systems” (OCTS) model. 
Specifically, it explores the formulation and implementation of this new 
constitutional order (a term increasingly used by Beijing), which 
distinguishes between the British colonial government and the current 
special administrative region (SAR) government under Chinese 
sovereignty. This article argues that terming Hong Kong as a property 
jurisdiction can better capture the urban governance of Hong Kong, which 
heavily relies on land and property activities, in its constitutional context 
under Chinese sovereignty. 
This article draws from a small, but important, part of literature in legal 
geography and urban studies to conceptually reflect upon the legal space 
of Hong Kong. Empirically, some evidence from declassified archival files, 
textual accounts and observations serve to demonstrate the spatio-legal 
manifestation of the urban ordering imposed in this property jurisdiction. 
In what follows, this article, firstly, revisits Anne Haila’s articulation of 
property state and uses some debates in legal geography to evaluate it. 
Then, it traces the making of the new constitutional order and explores 
the spatiality of this order as a property jurisdiction. Finally, this article 
concludes with the implications of the extended conception on studying 
urban governance and land injustice of Hong Kong.  
Theoretical considerations: property state and legal 
geography 
“In a property state, real estate plays an important role in the economy, 
public revenue and the wealth of people”, wrote Anne Haila (2016, p. 16). 
As for the purpose of this article, and that the concept of property state 
serves as a point of departure, it is necessary to discuss the intellectual 
history of, and explain, the concept of property state in details. For many 
decades before she rests in peace, Anne Haila had been interested in 
analysing capitalist cities with land rent theory as the major framework. 
Her theory about land rent was not only based on the economic sense but 
more importantly to develop that as a social relationship (Haila, 1990). 
As she stressed:  
rent as a social relation involves a power relationship and social 
control. These can be arranged in different ways: land can be private, 
common, public, collective, state, municipal and shared (Haila, 2016, 
p. 58). 
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Her comparative urban analysis was primarily based on case studies of 
landed property relations in various cities, focussing on government 
policies and institutions to analyse the mechanisms (notably government 
institutions and property markets) and the relationship between actors. 
While these various arrangements of property relations lead to different 
consequences, Haila was particularly interested in those cities with the 
kind of government (or, in her word, state) that directly engages in land 
market and related activities. As a result, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
having leasehold land system rooted in the British colonialism in common, 
became her laboratories. Following her comparative analysis of the 
political economies of Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1990s, Haila (2000) 
proposed to term these two cities “property states”. 
 
Table 1 A comparison between urban regime and property state 
 Urban regime Property state 
Primary 
concern 
Governing capacity of a local 
state 
The role of land and property 
development in a state 
Concepts  
 
Power relations between 
actors, social production 
model, social control model (in 
China) 
Land relations, rent, 
institution, tenure 
 
Characteristics  
 
The local state and non-state 
actors build coalitions for 
benefits 
Land property and real estate 
do not only form an important 
public revenue but also 
dominate the whole economy 
and society 
Places of 
theorisation 
origins  
Cities in the USA, especially 
Atlanta 
Hong Kong and Singapore 
 
 
The concept of property state significantly differs from other concepts in 
the broader literature on urban governance and politics because they seek 
to conceptualise different characteristics observed in cities and address 
different concerns. The author is mindful of the existence of these concepts. 
Theorising from the local urban politics in the USA, urban regime theory, 
among others, concerns the governing capacity of the local state. It 
focusses on the power relations at the local state and dynamics between 
the state and non-state actors in coalition-building for maximising their 
benefits (Stone, 1989, 1993). However, though some works probe urban 
politics of Chinese cities (Xu and Lin, 2019; Zhu, 1999) or Hong Kong 
(Chiu and Lui, 2003) with urban regime theory, the context of urban 
regime theory is irrelevant to this article because landed property is not 
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the primary concern of this theory, and the sovereignty and state issues 
are also not its foci (Table 1). For the aim of this article, extending the 
concept of property state to property jurisdiction shall address the 
substantial character of the reality of Hong Kong overlooked by these 
concepts: the constitutional order of Hong Kong under the Chinese 
sovereignty. 
Property state has two core characteristics, which are evidently found in 
common from analysis of Hong Kong and Singapore. The two cities share 
the features of having a high-density and high-rise urban environment, a 
government as the landowner of the limited land resources, a land 
mechanism of leasehold system, which leases land for specific lengths of 
time periods. These urban features have brought up two characteristics 
of property state into consideration. 
(1) Land property and real estate form an important source of 
public revenue in the public finance. 
Because of the leasehold land system, the government is able to 
collect a significant proportion of public revenue through leasing 
land, land premiums and property tax (Haila, 2000). After 
acknowledging this observation, Haila further conceptualised the 
public revenue generated from the use and sale of landed property, 
which is owned by the state as “fiscal rent” (Haila, 2016). 
(2) Land property and real estate dominate the whole economy 
and society. 
This can be seen by the constitution of stock market by important 
real estate companies and the substantial contribution to economic 
growth made by this sector (Haila, 2000). Property development, 
investment and speculation virtually became the only way for 
wealth accumulation as a result, and the wealth of people is 
intertwined with property that “people are keenly aware of 
property prices” (Haila, 2017, p. 503), socially making people 
property-minded. 
This article suggests that these two characteristics can be considered as 
responding to the two main functions of the state, according to state 
theory. It is always debatable what the state is, does and should do. 
Generally speaking, the state performs two functions, economic and 
ideological, as a legal geographer Blomley (1988) summarised. The state, 
in part, has to govern and facilitate economic growth and also 
ideologically legitimise the social relations of production (Johnston, 1990). 
The first characteristic of property state makes room for the state 
apparatus to function with a tax base, while its second characteristic has 
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a widespread impact on gaining the social support for the property-led 
society. 
Despite the commonalities between Hong Kong and Singapore, Haila 
(2017, 2016) also noted the differences between two cities in terms of 
development path and policies, including public housing tenure, economic 
regulations and participants of the stock markets. However, this article 
argues, to further use the capacity of this conceptualisation with property 
thinking, there is a need to push the work forward to consider a missing, 
but substantial, difference between two cities: the constitutional order. 
Singapore is an independent sovereign state, but Hong Kong does not 
fulfil the definition of the state provided its status as an administrative 
region in China. As this important difference is absent from the analysis 
of land regimes and their historical development, this limitation in the 
conceptualisation has regrettably loosened the concept. The literature is 
found to have a growing interest in exploring the relations between 
property and sovereignty, and the latter deserves attention here when 
reflecting upon the concept of property state. Legal geography, this article 
suggests, can help with this task. 
Urban scholars comprehend the political entity of Hong Kong with the 
concept of state, such as city-state (Chiu et al., 1997; La Grange and 
Pretorius, 2016), especially when compared with Singapore, and semi-
state (Yang and Li, 2013). Some also adopt this notion for fitting their 
works within the established theory or framework without probing them 
with the social reality (for example, Lai et al., 2019). Similarly, Haila 
adopted the notion of “state” to describe both Hong Kong and Singapore. 
However, the meaning of state is indeed ambiguous. Though social 
scientists are attempting to extend the definition of state to capture what 
they understand as complex phenomena, many of these have gone too far 
from the crucial and core ideas. A concept is not useful if its meaning is 
too broad, and it is always useful to return to the basics (if the basics are 
not included in the so-called “extended concept”, then that is not actually 
an extended concept but a tampered one). The most basic understanding 
of state is a political entity, where a sovereignty exercising authority over 
a territory – what can be understood as a country. This is the case for 
Singapore. However, this understanding should have been rejected in the 
case of Hong Kong. If we take the classical sociological definition provided 
by Max Weber (Blomley, 2003), Hong Kong itself does not monopolise 
the legitimate use of physical force within the territory because that is 
ultimately monopolised by Chinese sovereignty. Relatedly, sometimes the 
state is also understood in terms of a central-local relationship. In a federal 
system, for example, in the USA and Switzerland, local states still enjoy 
residual power after certain powers are centralised by the central state. 
However, the constitutional order explicitly announces that Hong Kong 
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does not enjoy any residual power, as will be elaborated below. Moreover, 
in the literature on central-local state relations, the analysis based on the 
western liberal democracies model shows contradictory ideologies might 
exist in central and local states, and this complex organisational nature 
of the state sometimes leads to conflicts in performing the functions of the 
state (Blomley, 1988). The local state can disagree with the central state 
because of, in part, party politics and other reasons. Lefebvre (1996, p. 
125) alerts the differences between the power structures in different cities 
that: 
[i]n the United States, the difficulties of Federal administration, its 
conflicts with local authorities, the terms of reference of ’urban 
government’, divided among the manager, the political boss and the 
mayor and his municipality, cannot be explained in the same way as 
the power conflicts (administrative and juridical) in Europe and in 
France. 
In Singapore, such a central-local relationship does not exist. For the case 
of Hong Kong, this relation can hardly be uncritically applied to 
understand the relationship between China and Hong Kong because the 
governments share consistent ideologies under the new constitutional 
order. 
To reach a useful analysis of Hong Kong, there is a need to differentiate 
the constitutional order of the SAR government from that of the colonial 
government. The ideology and governance practices of Hong Kong are 
subject to the new constitutional orders imposed by Chinese sovereignty. 
This constitutional order is both a sovereignty claim and a spatio-legal 
claim for territorial integrity. However, the notion of property state, 
though considered the two functions of government, fails to consider this 
unique legal space of Hong Kong.  
Jurisdiction, this article suggests, provides a useful conceptual tool for 
deciphering the legal space of Hong Kong, following the works in legal 
geography (Blomley, 2013; Cowan et al., 2012; Delaney and Leitner, 1997; 
Freeman, 2017; Jeffrey, 2020; Valverde, 2005, 2009). Jurisdiction is 
defined as “the territorial limits of legal authority”, which is also the 
“geographical extent to the exercise of law or a legal system” (Jeffrey, 2020, 
p. 1). Literally, jurisdiction has two meanings, one is the exercise of 
judicial power, another is the territory within which such an exercise is 
legitimised. Above this surface, it is clear that jurisdiction is closely-
related to sovereignty. Without sovereignty, there is neither separation of 
powers in the state nor judicial power. So, jurisdiction implies the presence 
of state power, much more than only judicial power. In other words, 
jurisdiction is a spatio-legal manifestation of state sovereignty. “The 
complex machinery of such legal assemblages as “jurisdiction” has yet to 
be thoroughly mined for purposes of theorizing governance”, Valverde 
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(2009, p. 155) writes. In terms of the political reality, Hong Kong is a 
jurisdiction, territorially within China, under Chinese sovereignty. 
Conventionally, this can be perceived with imaginaries of a hierarchical 
model with vertical and nested scales (Brenner et al., 2003). However, this 
scalar logic might be dangerous. Scales are powerful as they are a 
technology of government, having a performative force to organise legal 
practices (Blomley, 2013). The state sovereignty uses such a scalar logic 
to construct jurisdiction as ordered and universal as discrete areas with 
hard boundaries (Blomley, 2013). The dangerous effects of accepting this 
view, for Blomley (2013, p. 6), is to “militate against an interstitial 
conception of legal space”, having the relational thinking of the 
uncertainty and the complexity abandoned.  
However, this article suggests, recognising the existence of jurisdiction as 
the legal space of a city does not mean accepting this taken-for-granted 
scalar logic. Indeed, acknowledging the political reality, that the powerful 
scalar logics are at work, is the only way that provides the opportunity 
to reflect upon the problems of urban governance. It is to say, through 
studying the performativity of scales, one can make clear how things are 
into being. As argued elsewhere2, scalar politics are involved when the 
states attempt to use such a government technology to link certain 
governance problems (for example, new town planning in Hong Kong) 
with a specific question that can be governed by a distinct jurisdiction. 
The effect of this is to reduce the complexities of urban politics into 
narrowed and often technical, conversations. This shows conceptualising 
a city as a jurisdiction does not necessarily lead to the pitfall of the 
problematic geographical imaginary. In contrast, this is important for 
understanding how Hong Kong and China are brought together in a 
jurisdictional relation, which is an undeniable reality. Terming Hong Kong 
as a jurisdiction, which has the capacity to consider both the functions 
and relations of the governments, allows reflection upon the new 
constitutional order, that is, imposed by the powerful state sovereignty, 
and pushes forward the debates about property state. As argued, 
extensions of concepts retain the basic cores of the original one, including 
both conceptual and epistemological; when conceptualising the concept of 
property state, the importance of history was stressed (Aalbers and Haila, 
2018). With this emphasis, a historical-geographical enquiry is accordingly 
necessary. This understanding of jurisdiction requires an exploration of 
the complex urban governance in terms of scales and plural temporalities 
(Valverde, 2009). To further develop this concept of property jurisdiction, 
 
2 The author develops this argument in another paper presenting an archival study 
of Tin Shui Wai new town planning and the Sino-British negotiations over the future 
of Hong Kong (Yip, forthcoming). 
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this article now turns to the formulation of the new constitutional order 
during the Sino-British Negotiations in the 1980s. This new constitutional 
order differentiated the colonial and the SAR governments. 
New constitutional order 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration was a legal product of the two states’ 
negotiations over the colony’s future in the early 1980s. On this 
international treaty outlining the constitutional arrangement of Hong 
Kong after the sovereignty transfer to China in 1997, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) declared the basic policies of governing Hong 
Kong, which is known as OCTS. This declaration solved the land lease 
problem, which concerned the society, but it also imposed a new spatio-
legal order that leads to land injustice. The Basic Law promulgated in 
1990 replaced the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions in colonial 
Hong Kong to become the supreme constitutional instrument after 1997. 
Since then, the Chinese sovereignty strengthened their rule over this 
territory by interpreting and clarifying the ideological and legal principles 
stated in these constitutional documents or quoting the term increasingly 
used by the pro-Beijing scholars and commentators, the “new 
constitutional order”. For a long time, some legal scholars in Hong Kong 
have been exploring the complexities of the new constitutional order and 
examining the continuity of the colonial common law system (Ghai, 1999; 
Wacks, 1999). This article contributes a historical-geographical enquiry 
to this exploration. 
Different memoirs of the Chinese leaders commonly documented that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Deng Xiaoping had not thought 
of a preliminary solution to the question of Hong Kong until mid-1982 
(Huang, 1997; Lu, 2009; Xu, 1993). The secretariat of CCP decided to 
resume the sovereignty of Hong Kong in April 1981 as “forced” by a 
scheduled meeting with Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, 
in September 1982, but they had no idea of how to resume and govern 
Hong Kong. Deng charged Liao Chengzhih, who was leading the secretly 
established Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), to form a 
study team of five persons3 and propose the preliminary principles of 
governance within three months. Around March and April in 1982, this 
team submitted 12 principles of basic policies, which are roughly the same 
as what were included in Annex I of the Declaration (Huang, 1997). When 
Huang was writing the first draft, he added a clause at the end of these 
principles: “these principles are guaranteed to remain unchanged for X 
 
3 The five members include Liao himself who directly presided the decisions, Huang 
Wenfang of Xinhua in Hong Kong, and Lu Ping who carried the working title of the 
team chairperson. 
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years after 1997”. This clause was intended to stabilise the society because 
the team realised that most of the people in Hong Kong were feeling 
hesitate to the sovereignty transfer (Huang, 1997; Lu, 2009). Liao 
suggested “just give 50 years” if the rationale was just to ensure the 
confidence of the society4 . Deng then instructed the team to further 
prepare for a final proposal within one year by conducting field 
investigation in Hong Kong (Lu, 2009, p. 17), he himself also interacted 
with twelve batches of Hong Kong businessmen, most notably the 
property developers, in Beijing in early 1982. Rather than the livelihood 
of the general public, the confidence of the business sector concerned the 
state. Before the idea of OCTS was clearly formulated, Liao decided the 
basic policies should maintain the capitalism and lifestyle of Hong Kong 
to help maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, so as to 
benefit the four modernisations. Having these basic principles in mind, 
Deng was ready to meet Margaret Thatcher in September. 
In September 1982, when Thatcher insisted the validity of the 
international treaties and sought to continue the governance and 
administration of Hong Kong to maintain its prosperity, Deng (1993, p. 
1) strongly opposed.  
Our basic position on the question of Hong Kong is clear. There are 
three major issues involved. One is sovereignty. Another is the way 
in which China will administer Hong Kong so as to maintain its 
prosperity after 1997. In addition, still another is the need for 
Chinese and British governments to hold appropriate discussions on 
ways to avoid major disturbances in Hong Kong during the 15 years 
between now and 1997. 
As such, Deng proposed to treat Hong Kong with special policies. However, 
Thatcher doubted whether the Chinese leaders understood that the 
principles of the rule of law and the free society were crucial to the 
prosperity and stability of Hong Kong (Chung, 2001). However, the 
British also understood Hong Kong was not defensible because Hong Kong 
had relied on China for food and water supply that controls the lives of 
people and secures the sovereignty over Hong Kong (Cheung, 2014). 
Moreover, Hong Kong’s value as a colony was its economic advantage, 
and if China were to intervene Hong Kong violently, the British would 
lose the advantages. Any tensioned confrontation between states was in 
no sense favourable to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong (Chung, 
2001). After the Sino-British Negotiations officially started in July 1983, 
the British changed their position to forgo both sovereignty and 
administration of Hong Kong after the expiry of land lease. 
 
4 Huang (1997) emphasised the number of years was not related to the prediction of 
economic growth of China. 
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After clearly stating the OCTS principle in early 1984 for the first time, 
Deng (1993, p. 6) explained this to an industrial and commercial 
delegation from Hong Kong in June,  
We have stated on many occasions that after China resumes in 1997, 
Hong Kong’s current social and economic systems will remain 
unchanged, its legal system will remain basically unchanged, its way 
of life and its status as a free port and an international trade and 
financial centre will remain unchanged and it can continue to 
maintain or establish economic relations with other countries and 
regions. [emphasis added] 
It is noteworthy that continuing the social and economic systems will 
maintain the prosperity and stability, while changing the legal and 
political systems shall legitimise the Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong 
(Deng, 1993, p. 11). Deng also explained to the British that they have 
been formulating OCTS for several years as “a means of settling the 
Taiwan and Hong Kong questions” (Deng, 1993, p. 12). 
In many places on the Declaration and the Basic Law, capitalist economy 
was emphasised. This was mainly because the Chinese state realised 
befriending the capitalists is important for benefitting China. For the 
Chinese:  
to penetrate into society through the top elite and then to befriend 
the middle stratum of professionals and businessmen had long been 
the objective of the united front in Hong Kong (Chu, 2010, p. 19). 
As Xu (1993), the Xinhua Hong Kong Director, further explained, OCTS 
was formulated after investigating the mentality of the capitalist class, 
who was found not opposing socialism and was designated as the executor 
of this constitutional principle. The term “Hong Kong people administer 
Hong Kong” means that the capitalist class administers the society. In his 
words, if the SAR government was to be organised by the working class, 
OCTS would be violated. The working class shall only co-operate with, 
monitor and influence the SAR government, but not take up the 
leadership role. This implies two characteristics of the new constitutional 
order, in part the urban governance is not autonomous, not being 
equivalent to the conception of a local state, but being territorially 
integral to the sovereignty of the central state, and in another part a class 
bias favouring the capitalist class underlies the urban politics of Hong 
Kong. 
Relatedly, the new constitutional order was further clarified by Beijing 
through some writings after 1997 (Jiang, 2007, 2017; Wang, 2013)5. These 
 
5 Both Jiang Shigong and Wang Zhenmin are legal scholars and law professors in 
Beijing; both of them had served in the Liaison Office of the Central People’s 
Government in Hong Kong. 
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include a significant white paper entitled The Practice of the “One 
Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, which was directly published by the Chinese State Council in 
June 2014 (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). This 
white paper is an authoritative presentation of the Chinese state’s position 
and stance on Hong Kong, emphasising the complete jurisdiction exercised 
by the Chinese sovereignty. Suggesting that Hongkongers do not have a 
sufficient understanding of the OCTS principle and the Basic Law, the 
Chinese state appointed legal scholars to write this white paper. They 
clarified that the high degree of autonomy of Hong Kong is neither a full 
autonomy nor a decentralised power from the Chinese state. Instead, it 
should be understood as the power which is authorised by the central 
leadership for Hong Kong to run the local affairs. The degree of autonomy 
“is subject to the level of the central leadership’s authorisation”. Moreover, 
the power relation between the Chinese state and Hong Kong is peculiarly 
different than that between the federal government and the states in the 
American context or between the state and municipality in the European 
context, as the white paper states that: 
the ‘one country’ is the premise and basis of the ‘two systems’, and 
the ‘two systems’ is subordinate to and derived from ‘one country’. 
But the ‘two systems’ under the ‘one country’ are not on a par with 
each other.  
In other words, there is no residual power in Hong Kong. This implies the 
relation between China and Hong Kong is not equivalent to the 
conventional central-local state relation as discussed. 
These ideological principles around the complete jurisdiction did not 
suddenly emerge but are deeply embedded in the historical formulation of 
the new constitutional order 6 . When Deng Xiaoping talked to the 
members of the committee for drafting the Basic Law in 1987, he 
emphasised that “Hong Kong’s system of government should not be 
completely Westernised; no Western system can be copied in too” (Deng, 
1993, p. 55). Deng explicitly rejected the ideas about the separation of the 
three powers, multi-party elections, bicameral legislature, and universal 
 
6 It remains an intriguing question to ask why the legal practitioners in Hong Kong 
often refuse to accept the new constitutional order. They thought the order is 
something added to the Basic Law due to the tensions emerged in recent years. These 
practitioners, and a proportion of the general public were not aware of the unequal 
power relations between China and Hong Kong. They forgot that they actually have 
no choice to choose between accepting or rejecting the new constitutional order. The 
new constitutional order constitutes the reality of Hong Kong. If the legal 
practitioners and the general public find the status quo problematic, they must face 
this reality and challenge it, rather than only mobilising their common law 
imaginaries to resist against the new constitutional order. 
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suffrage. Deng also highlighted that he agreed that Hong Kong’s affair 
would naturally be administered by the people of Hong Kong, but it did 
not mean democracy or universal suffrage would be appropriate because 
the administrators must be “people of Hong Kong who love the 
motherland and Hong Kong”. He also made it clear that it will not be a 
realistic idea for the Central Government not to intervene in Hong Kong’s 
affairs (p. 57). Deng urged the committee members to “draft very carefully, 
proceeding from realities” and to embody the concept of OCTS (p. 58). 
When the Basic Law has been drafted, Deng appraised the document as 
a “creative masterpiece” (p. 63) on 17th February 1990.  
The above discussion appears to reject conceptualising the legal space of 
Hong Kong as a state. Instead, understanding Hong Kong as a jurisdiction 
can help recognise the reality of this society and its relationship with the 
sovereign state. As Jonas (2015, p. 26) writes, each level of the state 
“exercises its powers across a territorial jurisdiction”. This is important 
for clarifying the nature of urban governance in Hong Kong, extending 
Anne Haila’s conception. It is acknowledged that the new constitutional 
order affects urban governance in every aspect. To demonstrate how 
property jurisdiction can extend property state, this article now moves to 
focus on, among others, the aspect of land and property development. 
Legal geography of property jurisdiction 
This section extends the two characteristics of property state by 
considering how land and property development do not only create 
government revenue and dominate the economy but also fulfil the new 
constitutional order of this jurisdiction to favour the sovereignty, 
including economic interests and territorial integrity. There are two 
characteristics of the post-1997 Hong Kong as a property jurisdiction. 
Firstly, land property and real estate development form the major source 
of public revenue in the public finance within this jurisdiction, which is 
spent on megaprojects, which serve the economic interests of the Chinese 
state and fulfil the territorial integrity claim. Secondly, land property and 
real estate development dominate the whole economy and society with a 
class bias favouring the capitalist class, who is treated as the governing 
and commercial partner with the Chinese sovereignty (not merely with 
the local government due to the three-player game (Fong, 2014) as 
discussed below). To facilitate these operations, legal arrangements 
related to land rent and relations are central to re-configurate this 
territorial jurisdiction after the sovereignty transition. This section begins 
with an account of the legal changes made to the land-related public 
finance and the underlying reasons, which are to be followed by a brief 
discussion of their consequences for land injustice and territorial integrity, 
as evidenced by the empirical data of public finance. 
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What triggered the Sino-British Negotiations was the urgent problem of 
land lease expiry of the New Territories. There are two observations about 
that episode (Yip, forthcoming): firstly, the Chinese did not trust the 
British; and secondly, the Chinese leadership could not comprehend the 
legal concepts and the land lease problem as they had no knowledge about 
the English law, and because of the socialist system they had no 
knowledge about the political economy of real estate property market, so 
they sought expert knowledge from Hong Kong. This strengthened the 
need to include the urban elites in the united front work. A key person at 
stake here is Chun-Ying Leung. Since the economic reform, Leung started 
teaching professional knowledge of land surveying in China. In early 1984, 
almost reaching the end of the Negotiations, HKMAO consulted Leung 
on the land lease problem. Leung drafted the land lease arrangement, 
which was fully adopted by Deng as Annex III to the Joint Declaration 
(Leung, 2011). 
Annex III, entitled Land Leases, announced the decision of extending all 
the existing land leases until 2047, the policies of land leasing, and the 
changes to the public finance relating to land rent. Most notably, the 
declaration imposed a quota of land sales during the years before 1997 
and regulated the use of the land revenue on infrastructure and land 
development only. These two measures were proposed because Beijing 
suspected that the British might lease out all the land in Hong Kong for 
transferring money to Britain. As Deng (1993, p. 13) said in July 1984,  
leases of land will be valid for 50 years after 1997 and that the 
British Hong Kong Government may use the income from the sale 
of land. However, we hope it will use that income for capital 
construction and the development of land, and not for administrative 
expenses.  
To prevent capital outflow, Leung tried to incorporate these principles 
into measures that could be written into Annex III. It is likely that he 
was aware of the Capital Works Reserve Fund (CWRF) that was 
established in 1982 before approving the Tin Shui Wai new town 
development project (Yip, forthcoming). CWRF was a technicality in the 
public finance to fund public works on a project basis, which had no 
relation with the land revenue. Leung took advantage of this prevailing 
institutional design to link up the land revenue and the expenditure on 
infrastructure and land development, departing from its original intention 
to favour the Chinese political will. The Joint Declaration required all the 
land premium income earned by the colonial government “shall be put 
into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land 
development and public works in Hong Kong”. Then that the land income 
after reducing the land production cost shall be shared by the colonial 
government and the future SAR government in a Land Fund. Thus, only 
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half of the land revenue could be used by the Colonial Government. This 
legal change fundamentally modified CWRF because Leung, on the one 
hand, stressed the usage of money in the fund could only be infrastructure 
and land development; and, on the other hand, specified the sources of 
revenues of the fund that all the land income must be deposited into it, 
unlike the previous practice of the colonial government. 
Land injustice is one of the consequences of this legal change. Land 
injustice is a contested standard to assess the good use and treatise of 
land. This standard can be tentatively delimited to the process of land 
value creation and appropriation (Yip et al., 2019). As such, land justice 
is defined as: 
an aspiration that the urban inhabitants are entitled to the rights to 
difference and the city during the process of land production, which 
fairly utilises the differential locational advantage of urban land for 
satisfying the needs in public urban life (Yip et al., 2019). 
To the specificity of this legal change, there are three main land injustice 
problems relating to the legal geography of property jurisdiction. Firstly, 
it concerned the outlook of managing the future land needs. Li and Yu 
(1987) concluded that the land sales restriction was not in favour of the 
future development of the city because imposing a land sales quota might 
lead to land supply shortage and reduce the land revenue that affects the 
public finance. Secondly, this has eliminated the possibility of 
redistributing the land income, as a collective product of the society in 
the urban land nexus (Roweis and Scott, 1981), into social welfare, 
education, public health, public housing or other areas of government 
expenses7. Lai and Chau (2019, p. 7) wrongly understand the public 
finance reality of Hong Kong when they claim the land monopoly has 
redistributed the land income to fund subsidised public housing and 
education and sustain a surplus budget. Finally, a neoclassical economic 
conception of land as property has dominated the society. This favours 
the property developers and urban elites. As Xu (1993, p. 237) as a CCP 
official observed, as property developers had massive land hoarding and 
there was an oligopoly real estate market, they urged the land commission 
to strictly follow the quota: if extra land were leased, their profit would 
decrease. Until today, it is still important to recognise the partnership 
between the Chinese state and the capitalist class in governance (Fong, 
2014), which reinforces the conception of property jurisdiction that the 
sovereignty exercises the power at this scale. He argued that the nature 
 
7  In the current practice, the SAR government virtually ignores the existing 
mechanism, which allows the transfer of money between CWRF and the general 
accounts for the social services at the discretion of the Financial Secretary, except 
the few transfers in the first few years after the sovereignty transfer. 
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of the governing alliance in Hong Kong has changed from a two-player 
game to a three-player game, because in the past the British state did not 
directly get involved in the colonial affairs. However, the Chinese state 
has “stepped in by co-opting the business sector on its own through the 
appointment of NPC and CPPCC delegates and the united front work of 
the Liaison Office”8. In view of the increasing participation of the property 
developers and investors from China in the property market in Hong Kong, 
the new constitutional order, which separated Hong Kong as a jurisdiction 
with an independent economy has supported the rapid economic 
development of China. This was crucial for contemporary China because 
CCP had to rely on economic reform and rapid development to resolve 
their legitimacy crisis (Wang, 2011). 
Another consequence of the new constitutional order is territorial integrity. 
In addition to stating that the SAR region is an inalienable part of the 
PRC, the basic law also states that all the land resources of Hong Kong 
belong to the Chinese state, while the Chinese state allows Hong Kong 
Government to manage, use and develop the state property, as Article 7 
of the Basic Law reads: 
The land and natural resources within the Hong Kong SAR shall be 
state property. The Government of the Hong Kong SAR shall be 
responsible for their management, use and development and for their 
lease or grant to individuals, legal persons or organisations for use 
or development. The revenues derived therefrom shall be exclusively 
at the disposal of the government of the Region. 
Among other land development controversies, the massive construction of 
mega-projects and cross-boundary infrastructures is the case in point to 
illustrate the issues of land injustice and territorial integrity. To begin 
with, it requires a brief explanation of Chun-Ying Leung’s understanding 
of urban land, which informed his articulation of the legal change. Leung 
perceives urban land as a commodity with a value and argues for a 
“virtuous cycle” in urban development: when the land is sold to private 
property owners and the land premium is earned by the government, the 
government can make use of this money to construct infrastructure and 
produce more serviced land into the market, which once again brings 
money to the government. Leung promotes property ownership and 
argues housing should not be a welfare. Leung argues public housing for 
a government is not an asset but a liability: if the government, as the 
landlord, cannot satisfy the residents of the public housing who are the 
tenants, the residents will form power and oppose the government. The 
 
8 NPC refers to the National People's Congress. CPPCC refers to the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference. They are both part of the governing body 
of China. 
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achievement of a city, in his view, relies on the hardworking residents and, 
if the land revenue is spent on infrastructure, it implies that the private 
property owners are those who actually pay for the public works 
(Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, 2015; Leung, 1989; Shanghai Party History 
Research Center of the CPC, 2018). In other words, this model of urban 
development tends to exclude the non-owner inhabitants, while 
emphasising the importance of the private developers and urban elites. 
The empirical data of public finance can illustrate these consequences. 
The colonial and SAR governments have been massively investing in 
infrastructure by making use of the land premium deposited to CWRF 
(Figure 1). Figure 2 presents the expenditure spent on different categories 
of capital works projects in the last years of the colonial period. Some new 
categories, such as computerisation and port and airport development, 
were created to fulfil the social needs. The SAR government still follows 
this categorisation, which does not reflect the reality of usages or meet 
the social needs (Figure 3). For example, there is still a category named 
housing, which was allocated for public housing in the colonial period. 
However, public housing is no longer funded by the SAR government, and 
the detailed items currently listed in this category show this category of 
housing is for some government office buildings. After the sovereignty 
transfer, investment in highway has been continuously increasing and is 
now the largest expenditure. Under this category head, the majority of 
the items is not the road that mediates our everyday mobility, but mainly 
the cross-boundary infrastructures. It has been an explicit objective of 
constructing these megaprojects to facilitate spatial integration with 
China (Fong, 2017; Yang and Li, 2013; Yeung, 1997). These megaprojects 
include the Express Rail Link and Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge. 
These megaprojects were not initiated by the SAR government, but the 
Chinese central government which was directly involved in coordinating 
these constructions (Yang, 2006). The spatial effect of these megaprojects 
is to strengthen the territorial integrity between Hong Kong and China. 
Pang’s (2018) research on the activities of Chinese state capital in Hong 
Kong shows that these megaprojects were hugely beneficial to the Chinese 
enterprises by granting the construction contracts to them, providing the 
capital to China for implementing its national and geo-political strategies, 
including One Belt One Road.  
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Figure 1 Proportion of land premium in total government revenue (1990-
2018)
 
 
The case of Express Rail Link can further explain the spatiality of 
property jurisdiction. The co-location arrangement is to establish a joint 
checkpoint in the West Kowloon Terminal. A part of the Terminal is 
leased back to the Chinese state, and thus, Hong Kong’s jurisdiction over 
that part at the heart of the city is taken away. Although this 
arrangement did not have sufficient and clear legal basis, it was approved 
by the Legislative Council because of the existing legislature system, 
which by nature is dominated by the pro-establishment camp. One needs 
to note that this co-location arrangement is not as usual as its defenders 
claim. The defenders often cited the Eurostar and the US control points 
set up in Canada to justify that the practice of legal enforcement in 
another jurisdiction under such circumstances is a norm. However, these 
examples are different than the case of Hong Kong. In these foreign 
examples, only those laws relating to the clearance procedures would be 
applied to the local jurisdiction. In the co-location arrangement, the issue 
at stake is that the whole territory of the joint checkpoint and train 
platforms was taken away from the jurisdiction of Hong Kong. The 
government defended that this was because it was impossible to 
distinguish, which laws are related to clearance procedures. 
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Figure 2 Projects expenditure of the Capital Works Reserve Fund by 
category (1986–1997)  
 
 
Figure 3 Projects expenditure of the Capital Works Reserve Fund by 
category (2003–2017) 
 
 
Implications of the co-location arrangement can be discussed with two 
observations about the jurisdictional relations between Hong Kong and 
China. Firstly, following the new constitutional order, and especially the 
Basic Law, which articulates an understanding that the land in Hong 
Kong is state property, which is licensed out to the SAR government, the 
then Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen justified the co-location 
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arrangement for “there’s no problem with a landlord renting a room from 
a tenant” (Sum, 2017). Yuen added that “Beijing is the landlord and Hong 
Kong is its tenant” and the tenant “has the power to rent out the room”. 
This has reduced the complexity of sovereignty and territory into a 
simplified economic narrative of property. Secondly, it reveals the 
spatiality of sovereign power. On the surface, this arrangement leads to 
the situation that there is a jurisdictional territory, which cannot be 
governed by the SAR government situated in Kowloon9. During the 20 
years after the sovereignty transfer, the Chinese sovereignty was still not 
completely accepted by the Hongkongers. What has been witnessed in 
recent years is that the Chinese Government spent many efforts, including 
the White Paper as mentioned, to enhance their influences in Hong Kong 
to strengthen the legitimacy of the Chinese sovereignty. However, nothing 
is more powerful than producing a relational space that highlights the 
complete jurisdiction. From the perspective of China, Hong Kong is 
located at the periphery of the country. The political and ruling state 
power extends from the centre to the periphery through the highspeed 
railway network. Looking from the side of Hong Kong, the boundary 
between Hong Kong and China that was originally located at the 
periphery of the territory of Hong Kong, has suddenly moved to the city 
centre, resulting in the rising awareness of the existence of the Chinese 
sovereignty. This has fundamentally conceived a spatial imaginary about 
the OCTS as it is concretely controlled by the ruling power and 
materialised in the everyday spatial practices through boundary alienation.  
Concluding remarks 
Social scientists often propose new categories or name their observations 
and ideas with labels. This is, without any doubts, important for 
developing a language or a set of vocabulary to generate productive 
conversations. However, sometimes critiques would question why the new 
terms are valuable and irreplaceable. As some concluding remarks, it is 
appropriate to briefly summarise what the concept of property jurisdiction 
can add to the scholarship of Hong Kong studies. Extending the 
conception of Hong Kong as property state to property jurisdiction 
continues to highlight the reliance of the public finance and the economy 
on land property and real estate, and beyond this, the extended 
conception as jurisdiction, in both senses of territory and exercise of power, 
can capture the political reality of Hong Kong under the new 
constitutional order imposed by the Chinese sovereignty for prosperity 
 
9 This is similar to the Kowloon Walled City where the Qing insisted on stationing 
some officials in this place for symbolising their sovereignty in the territory that was 
leased to the British. 
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and stability. The usefulness of this conceptual extension is that it helps 
us to consider the land question of Hong Kong in a wider context of OCTS 
– for example, probing the geopolitical economy of real estate, which 
brings benefits to China, the infrastructure and megaprojects 
controversies in relation to the Greater Bay Area development plan of 
regional integration, and the territorial integrity claim made by China. In 
addition to the insights to legal geography, this conception of property 
jurisdiction highlighting the relations between cities and polities also 
contributes potential conceptual discussions to comparative studies of 
cities and territorial autonomies.  
Although this short article does not allow much space to draw on many 
concrete examples, the conceptual discussion of property jurisdiction and 
its interpretation of some public finance data and megaproject cases create 
some avenues to advance Hong Kong studies. Future analysis can decipher 
the property and real estate market of Hong Kong. Specifically, one may 
ask whether the developers and investors from China are willing to 
dominate the property market in Hong Kong, and this is relevant to 
understanding the multiple meanings and practices of property relations. 
Moreover, as real estate development is supported by many associated 
industries and eventually impacts every aspect of the society, researchers 
on property jurisdiction might widen the focus to investigate the 
consequence of the new constitutional order on the social transformation 
through the property lens. Further research can also conduct closer 
empirical studies to explore the jurisdictional relations, including the 
mechanisms and actors that maintain and stabilise the relations. More 
case studies of the megaprojects and the regional planning and 
development initiatives can serve this purpose, asking how the urban 
governance of Hong Kong has reinforced the new constitutional order. 
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